Say what you will about former postmaster general Louis DeJoy’s accomplishments, but one thing he did was ensure his policies lived on after he was out of office.
Even though DeJoy has been gone for over a year, his 10-Year Plan survives. Members of Congress, as well as most of the mailing community, have noted its wholesale failure to restore the Postal Service to financial health, reduce costs, or improve service. Yet, despite calls for it to be abandoned, the Postal Service adheres to its prosecution with undiminished zeal. Why that is so may not be as inexplicable as it seems.
Contributing factors
First, there’s the misguided belief that because it’s a plan, and the only published plan on hand, that it thus must be followed. Such an approach assumes that, without The Plan, USPS management wouldn’t know what to do, which isn’t a reasonable assumption.
Second, there’s the Governors of the USPS. Whether DeJoy browbeat them or otherwise sold them on The Plan, they signed-off on it. At this point, if they can independently access and read available information, they can see it’s not working. However, for reasons not knowable outside their closed-door meetings, they’re still committed to it. Whether this is because USPS management still has them in thrall of The Plan, whether they’re getting very different data about the agency’s performance, whether senior executives are really persuasive in advocating for staying the course, or whether they simply don’t want to admit that The Plan they backed isn’t working – we can only speculate. Regardless, they haven’t acted to do anything other than perpetuate it.
Third, there’s the initial decision by current PMG David Steiner to retain DeJoy’s senior staff. Being new to the USPS, Steiner relied on them to give him an accurate picture of the agency and its circumstances. If he expected anything objective he was naïve; those who briefed him were all DeJoy leftovers, many part of the team that birthed and advanced DeJoy’s Plan, and the last people who would say anything bad about it, let alone urge a fresh direction.
Lastly, there are those among the Postal Service’s leadership who are where they are because of Louis DeJoy. They were his hand-picked advisors and contributed to production of The Plan. Absent direction otherwise – or reassignment – they continue to execute The Plan that they and DeJoy formulated, still convinced of its wisdom and eventual success – despite clearly obvious results that would argue otherwise.
2021
In March 2021, when The Plan was issued, the Postal Service faced challenges, but it’s no better off today.
In 2021, volume was ebbing, but aside from whatever factors were causing that, aggressive price changes under The Plan have only worsened the downward trend.
Operating costs were too high, but the major cost driver – labor – remains ineffectively mitigated. DeJoy converted many non-career workers to full-time career positions in the belief that it would stabilize the workforce. Whether that objective was met or not, the agency now has too many employees, mostly with fixed schedules when more flexibility would be better.
Although the Postal Service points to its perilous financial situation, it continues to spend heavily on two parts of DeJoy’s Plan: a revised processing network – new and renovated facilities – and preparation for higher package volume. DeJoy complained about under-maintained buildings, and believed the USPS would be a major player in the package business; in turn, he initiated a multi-billion dollar reworking of the network. The package boom has yet to materialize, but the spending for new buildings and equipment continues.
“Efficiency”
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of The Plan was its overemphasis on “efficiency” as opposed to providing genuine good service that’s worth the price of postage. DeJoy brought in engineers, trained in the elements of “efficiency,” but without any exposure to the practical realities of USPS operations and lacking any understanding of the agency’s fundamental purpose – to provide service.
As a result, and as was demonstrated just last week in presentations during the quarterly meeting of the Mailers Technical Advisory Committee, the focus is on elements of cost in processing, subordinating whether the movement of mail aligns with a commitment to service. In turn, the engineers in charge figure how to fill trucks for “efficiency,” regardless of whether the handlings and processing steps to accomplish optimal truck utilization result in slower service.
(Ratepayers are left to wonder how putting time-sensitive mail on the same truck as other mail just to build a full load comports with product differentiation and attainment of different service expectations. Another win for “efficiency.”)
Of course, The Plan’s promoters shrewdly developed a mechanism to prevent processing changes from hurting service performance – repeated easing of service standards and the use of an ever-expanding list of exceptions to ensure only the most easily processed mail is “in measurement.” Here, too, DeJoy’s acolytes are still at work, telling the PMG (and MTAC) how good service is and issuing carefully managed statistics as proof. To serve their purposes, they alter the official time it takes to move mail from “a” to “b” to assert adherence to the ever-weakened service standards, discounting the actual service experienced by customers.
What should be done? First, admit The Plan is a failure and end further implementation and related spending. Second, replace DeJoy’s followers with other experienced executives who understand how to balance cost and service. Last, realize that ratepayers will be less averse to price increases if the true service they receive improves even faster. “Efficiency” may be good, but service is why ratepayers use the mail.