For Postmaster General Louis DeJoy, the new Atlanta Regional Processing and Distribution Center, 25 miles southwest of downtown, was to be a centerpiece example of how his 10-Year Plan would replace the “inefficient” network of “randomly” located processing centers with a matrix of “high-performing” facilities enabling “service excellence.”
Six months after its February 24 activation, the Atlanta RPDC is anything but; it and the other repurposed postal facilities in greater Atlanta have yet to live up to DeJoy’s hype. This was confirmed by an audit report released August 28 by the USPS Office of Inspector General.
Background
The OIG’s objective and process was simple:
“… to assess the operational impacts related to the launch of the RPDC and identify successes, lessons learned, and opportunities. We conducted observations of the Atlanta RPDC and surrounding mail processing facilities from March through June 2024.”
As the audit’s authors explain,
“Before the launch of the Atlanta RPDC, the Postal Service relied on 11 different facilities to process mail in the region. The Postal Service invested over $250 million to build out the Atlanta, GA, RPDC, consolidate regional operations, and close two annexes and two processing facilities. The Postal Service also consolidated all originating mail volume and incoming package volume from four other processing facilities covering Georgia and part of South Carolina, and absorbed operations from three contracted facilities. The Postal Service anticipates it will realize about $3 billion of savings over the next 30 years from these changes.
“The Atlanta RPDC is a new, one million square foot facility and one of the first RPDCs in the network. It includes several unique design and operating elements including one of the first Matrix Regional Sorter (MaRS), dock-to-machine mail induction, and a continuous operating plan. The Postal Service implemented a new design on the unloading dock for this facility by installing seven package machine induction points. The Postal Service expects this to allow employees to quickly unload mail from trailers and directly induct packages into operations via a system of conveyor belts. The Postal Service’s goal is for the facility to process over 1.1 million packages daily.”
Findings
- “Finding #1: Lessons Learned from the Atlanta RPDC Launch. … In late October of 2022, the Postal Service started modernizing the empty warehouse to meet its needs and standards. The Postal Service also installed its new package sorting machine, the MaRS, and it became fully operational in January 2024. …
“In October of 2023, the Atlanta RPDC started processing mail from a previously outsourced consolidation hub as the first step to reduce the overall number of facilities in the region. In November and December, the Postal Service added more package operations and volume during peak season, supporting the regional network. In January 2024, the Postal Service moved select package operations from three facilities and the contracted terminal handling service operations from one other facility to the RPDC. These were the first steps to consolidating all package and outbound letter and flat operations into the RPDC and converting the remaining facilities to LPCs.
“While the Postal Service had some limited successes in the lead-up to the launch of the RPDC, management also identified several lessons learned related to the RPDC launch. Specifically, management completed a post-implementation review 30 days after launch and identified the following as challenges when implementing the Atlanta RPDC:
- Management did not plan transportation schedules far enough in advance to support regional operations.
- Management did not align inbound mail volume and dock operations to reduce truck driver wait time.
- Management did not define a clear process to update mail transportation equipment labels to address significant changes in the network.
- Processes were not set up before launch to efficiently handle all mailstreams.
- Employee availability within the region was not properly determined before launch.
- Management did not train all employees on equipment or operating processes before launch.
“These issues increased overtime expenses and contributed to a significant decrease in service performance scores. Mail service performance in the Atlanta region declined significantly after the launch in February 2024. Specifically, the percent of mail delivered on time from the region declined for all mail classes, reaching its lowest levels in March. …”
The OIG found that the USPS didn’t apply what it learned from its previous RPDC activation:
“We recently completed an audit of the new RPDC in Richmond, VA and similarly recommended that the Postal Service continue to document the issues identified and actions taken to address issues in post-implementation reviews of RPDC conversions, and use the cumulative lessons learned when activating future RPDCs. The Postal Service agreed with that recommendation and provided evidence that they are conducting this type of review after the launch of RPDCs. However, they did not build on lessons learned from the Richmond RPDC to address similar barriers to success when launching the Atlanta RPDC. Management stated they developed plans to address these issues found in Atlanta and will work to avoid a repeat of these challenges during the launch of future RPDCs. …”
- “Finding #2: Challenges Executing Operations with New Plant Design. The Postal Service struggled to effectively execute operations with the new design of the Atlanta RPDC, which created congestion on the docks. Specifically, there was not sufficient space for personnel to unload trailers, move mail into the facility, stage mail for operations, and dispatch outgoing mail. In addition, the Postal Service increased the volume of mail at the Atlanta RPDC under the new “Go East/ Go West” initiative that consolidates cross country mail which made dock congestion even worse.
“The Atlanta RPDC uses a new dock design expected to allow employees to quickly unload mail from trailers and directly induct packages into operations via a system of conveyor belts. However, we observed this area was not large enough to accommodate the volume of mail and packages being unloaded into the facility. We observed that due to congestion, employees could not:
- Safely and effectively maneuver forklifts and pallet jacks.
- Efficiently move mail to other operations.
- Stage mail in a first-in, first-out manner.
- Unload trailers timely, causing some drivers to wait up to 13 hours to unload.
“Plant modernization management stated the operational plan called for using parking spaces in the trailer yard to store full trailers of mail, rather than having trailers and drivers waiting in line to drop mail at the facility. The Postal Service would move these trailers to an empty door when processing had cleared enough space at the unloading docks. In this manner there would never be more mail in the facility than could be staged and processed.
“However, this plan was not shared with operations and facility management as they stated they were unaware of such a plan. …
“The Postal Service expected to load and unload about 960 trailers per day. However, in the 12 weeks after launch the Postal Service averaged 720 trailers per day. Even with fewer than expected trailers, the Postal Service was unable to quickly check-in and unload trailers due to the congestion on the loading dock. Specifically, truck drivers had to wait up to 13 hours before processing operations cleared sufficient space for their trailers to be unloaded into the facility. Drivers not only had to wait in line to check-in and receive a dock door assignment, but also had to wait at the dock after their trailer was backed up to the door. Specifically, in the three months after launch, 204 or 21% of 977 drivers with GPS had to wait on average four hours before they were checked into the facility and provided a dock door assignment.”
“The docks where the RPDC dispatches, or sends mail to other facilities, were designed with the expectation that processed packages would flow directly onto the outbound trailer requiring minimal space for staging mail awaiting transport. However, the volume of packages in the 12 weeks after launch exceeded the Postal Service’s plan. We observed the dispatch docks did not always allow for sufficient staging. …
“We found that mail was moved under the MaRS to reduce congestion. We also observed forklifts operating within this area. The space under the MaRS is not intended to stage mail and is not safe for the movement of forklifts.
“In the weeks leading up to the launch, the Postal Service also selected the Atlanta RPDC as one of 10 centralized hubs for a new initiative which they are calling ‘Go East/ Go West.’ The aim of the initiative is to … dispatch full trailers of mail by creating a consolidation point for cross-country mail. This increased the amount of mail and containers coming into the facility which added to the congestion on the docks. These containers of mail needed to be sorted, staged, or directly loaded on outbound trailers. However, this initiative and its need to move many mail containers across the facility from inbound to outbound trailers was not considered when the facility was designed.
“When the mail volume exceeded processing capabilities and the Postal Service did not implement standard procedures to reintroduce this volume into mail processing, it resulted in significantly delayed mail.”
- “Finding #3: Staffing Challenges at the RPDC Resulted in Inefficient Operations. The Postal Service worked extensively with labor unions to staff the Atlanta RPDC, but still faced several staffing challenges, which exacerbated the other operational challenges and negatively impacted service. Specifically, most of the employees initially detailed to the RPDC did not stay after their temporary assignment ended; about 1,500 employees started at the RPDC on its launch date, but most did not receive training or know the operational layout of the facility. Further, employees were reassigned from the other facilities in the region to the RPDC, leaving the Atlanta LPC understaffed and unable to hire pre-career employees, due to labor agreements, to help bridge the gap. The Postal Service noted a lesson learned from its Richmond RPDC launch was that management did not train all employees on standard work instructions for new processes. The Postal Service repeated the mistake at the Atlanta RPDC by not training employees before launch of the facility. …
“The Postal Service estimated in March of 2024, that it would need about 400 employees to operate the Atlanta LPC. … However, as of June 7, 2024, the Postal Service estimated it needs over 600 employees to operate the Atlanta LPC. At that time, the Atlanta LPC was 122 employees … under the estimate.
“Many career employees were involuntarily reassigned from the other processing facilities in the region. This led to an increase in the use of sick leave and employees who did not come to work. … n the first 12 weeks after launching the Atlanta RPDC, the facility was short the equivalent of 189 employees a week due to unscheduled absences. These staffing shortages led to an increase in overtime pay. Overtime at the Atlanta RPDC accounted for about 13% of all workhours in the first 12 weeks after launch … .”
- “Finding #4: Management Was Not in Place to Supervise Operations. The Postal Service did not fill all management positions at the Atlanta RPDC before launch and vacant positions persisted at least four months after the launch. Specifically, 42 (57%) necessary front line supervisory positions were vacant at launch. The Postal Service placed employees in temporary management positions and brought in experienced management staffing from around the country to close the gap and provide oversight of mail processing operations. However, these managers from other locations were unfamiliar with the layout and planned operations of the RPDC.
“We observed issues throughout the facility due to insufficient supervision. This included operations such as manual mail, Postal Automated Redirection System (PARS) mail, package induction, and hazardous material handling that were not properly supervised. Throughout the facility, we found mail that had not moved; was not staged and organized in a first-in, first-out order; or was not placarded correctly.”
- “Finding #5: Mail Processing Facility Review Process Not Followed. The Postal Service completed public outreach at only two of six mail processing facilities before consolidating operations into the Atlanta RPDC. … The consolidation of mail processing operations from the Atlanta NDC, Peachtree P&DC, and North Metro P&DC appears to meet the requirements to trigger an MPFR. However, the Postal Service did not complete MPFRs for those facilities. Postal Service management stated that closing the Atlanta NDC and Peachtree P&DC did not change the service standards; therefore, no other actions were required. Further, management stated its long-standing interpretation of this requirement is the review process is only required when all operations move outside of a ‘service area’; therefore, no action was required for the North Metro P&DC.”
Recommendations
The OIG offered several recommendations:
- “… develop a platform operation plan with established procedures for tracking, staging, and organizing any mail moved off the docks to ensure it is timely entered into mail processing;
- “… communicate to management and follow a yard management plan at the Atlanta Regional Processing and Distribution Center (RPDC) and future RPDC sites;
- “… develop plans to orient and train employees to effectively perform operations before they start completing the new mail processing operations;
- “… work with labor unions to successfully staff future Regional Processing and Distribution Centers to allow for successful transitions for the Postal Service and its employees;
- “… develop contingency plans to handle low employee availability when implementing network changes;
- “… develop plans to provide facility specific training to management staff before they oversee the new mail processing operations;
- “… implement plans to hire sufficient managerial staff when implementing future network changes.
Management agreed with only some of the recommendations and findings.
Observations
The OIG’s report reinforces what has been seen and reported over the past months: the Atlanta RPDC is an ongoing fiasco that resulted from poor facility design, planning, communication, activation, and operation. Reading the report as a sequel to the earlier Richmond RPDC report easily reveals that, as the OIG stated, lessons were not learned – or at least not implemented.
How the Atlanta RPDC will ever become what it should be is an open question. Its physical limitations cannot be easily modified and so neither can the related challenges; staffing and management shortages and training will take months to deliver any benefit. Meanwhile, service remains sub-par.
Regardless, the situation deserves to be laid at DeJoy’s doorstep. It’s his siloed management structure, unrelenting pressure on subordinates, and demand for unquestioning adherence to what and how he wants things done that contributed to another shoot-ready-aim facility activation.
Whether regarding RPDCs, service standards, or cuts in mail collection and local transportation, his temporization to politicians, bullying bluster to stakeholders and the media, and transparently self-serving assurances to ratepayers have thus far kept him safe from serious consequences from Congress or, more importantly, from the USPS governors. How long his luck will hold remains to be seen.
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